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Last week at the United Nations, the MDG Africa
Steering Group discussed the Gleneagles Scenario. The
participants reiterated the need for scaled-up aid in order to
support the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). At the same time, a report issued by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) assessed the macroeconomic implications of
scaling-up aid in Benin, Niger and Togo. The report acknowledged
that higher levels of aid will put moderate to sizable pressures on
inflation and real exchange rates (IMF, 2008).
Concerns about such macroeconomic outcomes often constrain the
full use of aid. Policies become too restrictive to allow full spending
and absorption, even when aid is scaled-up. Countries are advised
to maintain high interest rates, adopt inflation-targeting, and limit
public expenditure. Macroeconomic policies have not been
expansionary enough to increase MDG levels of spending.
To identify how concerns about macroeconomic instability
have curtailed an effective response to MDG scale-up, we
look at the cases of Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. These countries
are confronting human development challenges and all of them
receive resources to respond effectively, but they are not using
those resources fully.
We compare spending and absorption before and during
the aid surge periods to demonstrate the stance taken by the
macroeconomic authorities in each country. Full absorption implies
that the current account deficit was financed by an amount equal
to or greater than the increase in the flow of aid. Full spending
means expansion of the budget deficit before grants during the
aid surge by an amount equal to the increase in aid.
The table shows that all of the aid was absorbed in Malawi, but only
59 per cent was spent through government fiscal expansion. Malawi
had lower international reserves, mainly because of high absorption.
Interestingly, the real exchange rate depreciated and the inflation
rate fell by 15.4 percentage points. Hence full absorption of aid in
Malawi did not result in macroeconomic instability.
In Zambia, 39 per cent of the aid was absorbed and only 6 per cent
was spent. As expected, the level of international reserves increased.
The inflation rate fell slightly. Surprisingly, the real exchange
rate appreciated in the face of low absorption and spending of
aid receipts. Despite the restrictive macroeconomic stance, Zambia
experienced a less encouraging macroeconomic outcome.
In Kenya, 33 per cent of the aid was absorbed and 22 per cent was
spent. A significant portion of the aid was used to settle domestic
debt and build-up reserves. The level of international reserves
almost doubled. The inflation rate fell, but the real exchange
rate also appreciated.
The above cases are classic examples of a pre-emptive macroeconomic
policy driven by fears of a “Dutch disease” effect. What is often
forgotten, however, is that short-term macroeconomic movements
are normal and expected after resources are scaled up. Large and
persistent changes in inflation and exchange rates indicate a lack
of supply response. Despite these obvious facts, the low level of
absorption and spending in these countries is a direct consequence
of macroeconomic conservatism.
According to their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), fiscal
policy in Malawi and Zambia focuses on keeping the overall balance
at less than 1 per cent of GDP. The targets for inflation are set at less
than 5 per cent. In Kenya, the inflation target for the period 2005–
2007 was 3.5 per cent.
Earlier publications of the International Poverty Centre have
emphasized the urgent need for large-scale programmes to meet
the MDGs. We reiterate those recommendations. Fiscal and monetary
policies have to be expansionary in order to scale-up resources in the
interest of achieving the MDGs. Macroeconomic management must
encourage full spending and absorption of aid.
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Aid Absorption, Spending and Macroeconomic Outcomes, Averages
  Malawi Zambia  Kenya 
  1999-02    2003-06 2001-03   2004-06  1995-99   2000-04 
Aid absorbed (%)  -  100  -  39  -  33 
Aid spent (%)  -  59  -  6  -  22 
Inflation rate   28  12.6  21.7  18.1  6.4  4.5 
Real exchange rate   103.2  75.5  108.2  139.6  69.9  72.6 
Reserves ($US millions)  213.3  182.2  322.1  373.3  735  1,244 
 